This article considers a simple stock-flow matching model with fully informed market participants. Unlike in the standard matching literature, prices are assumed to be set ex-ante. When sellers pre-commit themselves to sell their products at an advertised price, the unique equilibrium is characterized by price dispersion due to the idiosyncratic match payoffs (in a marketplace with full information). This provides new insights into the price dispersion literature, where price dispersion is commonly assumed to be generated by a costly search of uninformed buyers. This article considers a simple stock- ‡ow matching model with fully informed market participants. Unlike in the standard matching literature, prices are assumed to be set ex-ante. When sellers pre-commit themselves to sell their products at an advertised price, the unique equilibrium is characterized by price dispersion due to the idiosyncratic match payo¤s (in a marketplace with full information). This provides new insights into the price dispersion literature, where price dispersion is commonly assumed to be generated by a costly search of uninformed buyers.
INTRODUCTION
The standard matching approach originally developed by Diamond (1982) , Mortensen (1982) , Pissarides (2000) and Kiyotaki and Wright (1991) , assumes a purely random search process. Coles (1999) considers the other extreme, a stock- ‡ow matching, where a search is no longer random, but perfectly directed. Both strands of the literature commonly assume that price is determined by ex-post bargaining between buyer and seller after the match has been formed. In most types of markets, however, sellers advertise not only characteristics of products which they want to sell, but they also either fully pre-commit themselves to supply a good for an advertised price or the advertised price represents a signal for subsequent price negotiations.
This article assumes that sellers fully pre-commit themselves to supply a good for a given advertised price. Price distribution in the simpli…ed stock- ‡ow matching model by Coles (1999) with ex-ante price setting is analyzed. It is shown that despite full information on both sides of the market, the unique equilibrium poses price dispersion. Unlike in literature on equilibrium price dispersion, where price dispersion is commonly generated by costly search of imperfectly informed buyers, price dispersion in this model is driven by idiosyncratic match payo¤s: each buyer is assumed to either like or dislike the seller's good.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the general framework. Market equilibrium is characterized in Section 3. Following comparative statics in Section 4, the last section concludes.
FRAMEWORK
There is a mass S of sellers (…rms), each supplying one type of good for price p. The cost of supplying the good is assumed to be equal to c. The preferences of the buyer over goods supplied by sellers are heterogenous. As in Coles (1999) , it is assumed that each buyer can either like or dislike the good the seller provides . In case she does, her utility by consuming it is y p; otherwise her utility is zero. Given the mass S of sellers, the probability that a new buyer entering the market likes k of them is assumed to be given by Poisson distribution:
where > 0 is an exogenous preference parameter. If atomistic sellers are assumed instead, the preferences of the buyer would be given by a binomial distribution. If the buyer likes more than one good, she will purchase the cheapest. Note that under this set-up, there is a probability e S that the new buyer likes none of the existing goods. If the buyer likes no goods, she immediately leaves the marketplace. Hence 1 e S f b represents the ‡ow of buyers who likes at least one good in the market. The ‡ow of new buyers is matched by the stock of sellers. The mass of buyers at any point in time is zero. The model is set in continuous time and the individual discount rate is denoted by r > 0. This type of marketplace represents a modi…ed and simpli…ed version of Coles'(1999) stock- ‡ow matching model.
It is commonly assumed in the literature that in the marketplace with decentralized trade prices are formed by bargaining between the buyer and seller after the match had been formed. In many types of markets, however, when sellers advertise their products, they advertise prices as well. For simplicity, we assume that sellers set prices ex-ante and no negotiations are possible thereafter. The same results would be obtained if sellers could a¤ect the expected price from bargaining arbitrarily by sending ex-ante price signals. The assumption of ex-ante price setting has several interesting implications on the distribution of prices in the market.
EQUILIBRIUM
Before proceeding further, we formally de…ne equilibrium in this simple market.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). Equilibrium is a distribution of prices, denoted by F (p), and a mass of sellers S satisfying:
It is easy to see that there are no sellers willing to charge price p > y in equilibrium, since even the buyer who likes the good would consider it too expensive. Also, no seller charges price p 0, since her reservation value v s is strictly positive. Another interesting observation follows. Lemma 1. In equilibrium, any price p 2 (0; y] can not be charged by a positive mass of sellers.
The proof is in the appendix.
The essential idea is that if a positive mass S a of sellers charge price p a , then an arbitrarily small decrease in the charged price p a will discontinuously increase pro…ts. This is because there is a positive ‡ow of buyers who likes at least two goods for the price p a . The direct implication of Lemma 1 is that if equilibrium exists, it is characterized by price dispersion. This is despite the fact there is perfect information. Note that, if a …nite number of atomistic sellers is assumed instead, the same price would not be charged by two or more sellers in equilibrium. We can now turn to studying the equilibrium properties.
Theorem 1 (Characterisation of Equilibrium). The highest and the lowest price p; p and the distribution of prices F (p) charged in equilibrium satisfy:
Proof. The highest price, p, charged by a seller cannot exceed y, otherwise no one would willingly purchase her or his good. Zero turnover implies a lower value for the seller than the strictly positive reservation value v s . Note also that the seller's highest price cannot be strictly lower than y, otherwise an increase in p would not alter demand, hence pro…ts would increase. Now let us focus on the equilibrium price distribution F (p). Let f (p) denote the density of F (p). The value of being seller V s (p) can be written as:
The value of seller V s (p) must equal the reservation value v s . Equating V s (p) to v s in (6) establishes (5). The lowest price charged in equilibrium can be computed from (5) by noting that F p = 0. Now, we focus our attention to the existence of equilibria. Proposition 1. For 0 < v s < 1 r (y c) f b unique non-degenerate equilibrium (S ; F (p)) with …nite nonzero mass S of sellers exist:
Furthermore, this unique equilibrium is stable.
Both, the proof and the notion of stability considered are in the appendix.
Proposition 1 states that when the reservation value v s of sellers is not very high, non-degenerate equilibrium exists. The density of price distribution f (p) = 
COMPARATIVE STATICS
There are six exogenous parameters: the preference parameter , the seller's reservation value v s , the buyer's utility gain y, the ‡ow of new buyers in the market f b , the cost of production c and the individual discount rate r. We consider the e¤ect of exogenous parameters on the equilibrium stock of sellers S and on the equilibrium price distribution F (p).
Equilibrium Mass of Sellers
The equilibrium stock of sellers is given by equation (7). S will increase with an increase in the buyer's utility gain y and the ‡ow of new buyers in the market f b . The mass of sellers will decrease with an increase in the seller's reservation value v s , the production cost c and the discount rate r. The e¤ects of is unambiguous. For a market with supplied varieties close to each other, i.e. when heterogeneity parameter < ev s r= [(y c) f b ], an increase in would trigger an increase in the equilibrium stock of sellers. When goods supplied by the market are more heterogenous, i.e. > ev s r= [(y c) f b ], an increase in would trigger a decrease in S .
Equilibrium Distribution of Prices
A more interesting case is the equilibrium price distribution. We consider the …rst two moments and the threshold prices p ; p . The highest price p always equals the buyer's valuation y, and therefore does not depend on the other exogenous parameters. The lowest equilibrium price p is increasing with the production cost c, the seller's reservation value v s and the discount rate r. An increase in the . Let the value of the seller charging price p be denoted by V s (p) and let the equilibrium distribution of prices be denoted by F (p) (i.e. F (p) represents the proportion of sellers charging lower price than p). The value of the seller charging price p 1 can be expressed as:
(11) With probability 1 e 1 S e (1 1 )S a new buyer likes at least one of the goods for price p 1 and dislikes any other good. Hence the …rst term in the right side of the Bellman equation (11) is the rate at which only some of goods for price p 1 are liked multiplied by the gain (p 1 c) . c represents the cost of production. The second term captures the possibility that some buyers who like at least one good for price p 1 and also some other good(s) for price p 6 = p 1 might be willing to purchase for price p 1 (provided p 1 is cheaper). Now we will show that every seller charging price p 1 will have incentives to deviate and charge price p 2 = p 1 ", where " > 0 is arbitrarily small, therefore no price can be charged by a positive mass of sellers in equilibrium. The value of being a seller with price p 2 = p 1 " can be written as:
Where e
(1 1 )S represents the probability that exactly k goods supplied by 1 S sellers and no other goods are liked. Note that for k > 1, the price p 2 = p 1 " attracts higher demand. There is a discontinuous positive jump in the …rst term of the right side of the seller's Bellman equation, which establishes V s (p 1 ) < V s (p 1 ") for " being satisfactorily small. Definition 2. Equilibrium (S ; F (p)) is said to be stable if a small increase (decrease) in S would trigger a decrease (increase) in V s for nonzero subset of sellers, i.e.:
) V s (p; S ) 8p 2 F S with strict inequality holding for p 2 H 2 F S (13) where F S denotes the support of F (p) and sets H 1 and H 2 have nonzero measure. Otherwise equilibrium is said to be unstable.
Proof of Proposition 1. Equilibrium mass S of sellers can be solved from the value function of the seller charging the highest price p:
Noting that p = y in equilibrium (Theorem 1), we can solve for S in equation (14), which yields (7). It is clear from (7) that a solution exists (note that there cannot be a negative mass of sellers in the market) if and only if (y c) f b = (rv s ) > 1, i.e.: the reservation value of the seller must be lower than (y c) f b =r for S to be positive. Theorem 1 states that any equilibrium distribution of prices must satisfy equation (5), which can be directly solved for F (p). This establishes (8).
To prove the stability of equilibria, consider equation (6) describing V s (p). Any increase in equilibrium mass of sellers, would decrease V s (p) for all p 2 suppF (p). On the other hand, a decrease in S would trigger an increase in V s for every seller in the market.
